Did the Buddha exactly deny the ātman?

The question of what way did the Buddha exactly deny the ātman, often translated by ‘self’ is always a contentious issue and a baffling one.  Often, the answer to this question requires a sudden shift over to the Upaniṣadic ātman which is intended to make the reader assume that the Buddha was not a fan of the Upaniṣads and that he debated against the notion of an Upaniṣadic ātman.  But none of this has been proven.  It’s all speculation. 

To be sure, early Buddhism is silent about the Upaniṣads which is odd if the Buddha teaches a No-self (anātman) doctrine that that is supposed to go against the Upaniṣadic ātman.  Where in the Nikayas is the battle between Buddha, representing No-self (anātman), and the Upaniṣads representing Ātman, taking place?  According to I. B. Horner president of the Pali Text Society (1959–1981), “The Self (attā) as both divine and human was no more repudiated by the early Sākya than were either the Ātman as Brahman, or ātman as the self of man by the Upaniṣads” (The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected, p. 41).  If the theory of No-self is such a major part of Buddhism, where is it clearly and unambiguously stated? 

And what about the fact that a doctrine of No-self belongs to the doctrine of annihilationism (ucchedavādā)?  In the Ananda Sutta (Ānandasutta, SN 44:10) the Buddha tells Ananda:

When Vacchagotta asked me whether the self does not exist absolutely (natthattā), if I had answered that ‘the self does not exist absolutely’ (natthattā) I would have been siding with the ascetics and brahmins who are annihilationists (ucchedavādā).

The Buddha is telling us that he does not reject the self or ātman.  Nor do the Nikayas say that the self is any of the five grasping aggregates which make up our human life to which we are attached, all of which are conditioned and corrupt being equated with Mara, the Buddhist devil.  The Buddha also tells us several times to abandon desire for what is not the self and elsewhere abandon desire for whatever does not belong to the self (anattaniya) (S. iii. 78).

Of all the greatest religious blunders, I think Buddhism takes the cake in turning itself upside down; totally distorting what the Buddha taught.  Since it is evident that the Buddha realized and taught the transcendent (the unconditioned), how much different is it from Vedanta?  Not much.

Comments

[TheZennist]

Clyde: In Pali, self and no self are not attā or anattā but atthattā and natthattā which in English would be, "there is a self" and "there is not a self." The eternalist 'self-izes' one or more of the five aggregates while the annihilatonist/materialist rejects any possibility of a self, that is, something fundamental and primordial within each creature. In the Mahaparinirvana Sutra, buddha-nature is the ātman or self which, from the start, is always covered by innumerable passions (kleśa).

[clyde]

SN 44.10
Ananda Sutta: To Ananda
(On Self, No Self, and Not-self)
translated from the Pali by
Thanissaro Bhikkhu

Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: "Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?"

When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.

"Then is there no self?"

A second time, the Blessed One was silent.

Then Vacchagotta the wanderer got up from his seat and left.

Then, not long after Vacchagotta the wanderer had left, Ven. Ananda said to the Blessed One, "Why, lord, did the Blessed One not answer when asked a question by Vacchagotta the wanderer?"

"Ananda, if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those brahmans & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness]. If I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self — were to answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?"

"No, lord."

"And if I — being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self — were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'"

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn44/sn44.010.than.html