With such a denial, that there is no âtman, it cannot be ambiguous. To aver, emphatically, that the Buddha denied the âtman there must be clear statements by him in the Nikayas. If there are no such clear statements of denial then the claim has no merit. As a matter of fact, the Buddha might well be denying something else which, instead of being the âtman, is not the âtman.
Considered by many to be proof that the Buddha did, in fact deny the âtman, is Walpola Rahula’s book, What the Buddha Taught. But overall, nowhere in this book does Rahula produce an unambiguous statement that the Buddha categorically denied the âtman. Even here on page 62 there is ambiguity when the Buddha explains his reasons to Ananda.
'Ananda, when asked by Vacchagotta the Wanderer: "Is there a self?", if I had answered: "There is a self", then, Ananda, that would be siding with those recluses and brahmanas who hold the eternalist theory (sassata-vada).
Here, the Buddha is not denying or dodging the âtman. Instead, he is denying a special doctrine of certain recluses and brahmins. According to the commentarial literature,
“They declare material form to be the self and the world, stating such to be not only the self and the world but also eternal; they declare sensation ... perception ... the formations ... consciousness to be the self and the world, stating such to be not only the self and the world but also eternal” (trans. Masefiled, The Udana Commentary, p. 882).
Such a doctrine or view does not comport with what the Buddha taught about the Five Aggregates. This is why he cannot agree with Vacchagota. He rejects the aggregates as being the âtman. Above all, the Buddha doesn’t want us to believe that our self is an aggregate. As he teaches, all the Five Aggregates are, in fact, not the self or anâtman (P., anattâ).
'Monks, form is not the self (anattâ). What is not the self should be see as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self (attâ).’
Feeling is not the self... Perception is not the self...Habitual tendencies are not the self...Consciousness is not the self. What is not the self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self’” (S. iii. 22-23).
When I said earlier that the Buddha might well be denying something else which, instead of being taken to be the âtman, is not the âtman such as the Five Aggregates, it may well be what is going on in the above passage. In this next passage the Buddha explains to Ananda why he rejects the doctrine of there being no âtman.
'And, Ananda, when asked by the Wanderer: "Is there no self?" if I had answered: "There is no self", then that would be siding with those recluses and brahmanas who hold the annihilationist theory (uccheda-vada).
Here, the term “no self” in Pali is not the familiar anattâ which in English would be, not the self but rather nattha attâ which in English is, there is not a self. We might conclude from this the Buddha rejected annihilationism, that is, the denial of âtman. For the Buddha the âtman was not to be identified with the Five Aggregates, nor was it to be denied. The âtman is transcendent like nirvana. As a matter of fact,
“The self [âtman] (in thee), man, knows what is true or false. Surely the noble Witness, sir, the Self [âtman], you do misjudge, in that when sin is there you do conceal the Self [âtman] within the self [âtman]” (A. i. 149, trans. I.B. Horner). (Brackets are mine.)
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