Not in praise of skepticism or nihilism in Buddhism

 If according to Dante, “Hell is the impossibility of reason” then hell’s  two great philosophies, we might conjecture, are skepticism and nihilism.  In my opinion, there are no philosophies under the sun perhaps more absurd—and hellish—than skepticism and nihilism.  

 

First, the general definition of “skepticism” found in the dictionary pertains to “the doctrine that any true knowledge is impossible or that all knowledge is uncertain.”  (This also seems to suggest that science, too, is impossible inasmuch as science, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is defined as “The state or fact of knowing.”)  Next, on the philosophic level “nihilism” it is generally defined as being, “An extreme form of skepticism, involving the denial of all existence.”

 

While some can certainly argue there are critical differences between skepticism and nihilism, in the main they both seem to arrive at the same place, to quote T.S. Eliot, “wherein there is no ecstasy”(“East Coker”).  On a personal note, to be sure, there is no ecstasy in either.  One reaches an aporia—there’s no more except, hopefully, to be like a little mouse who is trapped inside of an old hollow bull’s horn, at its very end, who suddenly turns around and escapes!

 

Briefly looking at skepticism, the skeptic suspends even holding out the possibility of there being knowledge or gnosis of an absolute medium or pure Mind of which our world, according to the Lankavatara Sutra, is its phenomenalization.  

 

Turning to the nihilist who is not far from the skeptic, he regards everything as intrinsically empty—not empty in the sense of some kind of space-like substance or aether—but empty in the sense of being ‘just appearance’ or somewhat the same, illusory.  In other words, there is no absolute beyond this.

 

Where skepticism and nihilism seem to merge in Buddhism is in the Mâdhyamika school of Nagarjuna, his most famous work being the Mâdhyamikakarikas.  While some might insist I am stark raving mad for asserting this, nevertheless, there are two excellent books that go along way in supporting my claim that skepticism and nihilism seem to merge in the Mâdhyamika school.  

 

The first book is Thomas McEvilly's, The Shape of Ancient Thought.  In his chapter on “Pyrrhonism and Madhyamika” he brings the reader's attention to a general comparison of Nagarjuna's karikas with the tropes of the Greek and Roman skeptics.  The parallels are astonishing, to say the least.  In the following chapter, McEvilly's sums it up for us by saying:

 

“The overall stance toward life of Madhyamikas and Pyrrhonists [i.e., skeptics] was similar, indeed nearly identical; the dialectic which supported this stance was similar, indeed nearly identical; and the purpose for which this stance was adopted and this dialectic practice was similar, indeed nearly identical.  Did the parallelism arise out of contact and diffusion, or was it a remarkable result of independent, parallel development?” (p. 491)

 

The next book which is on Madhyamaka nihilism is Haarsh Narain's, The Mâdhyamika Mind.  A well written book and not too difficult to read for the average Buddhist reader, Narain makes his case for the jury that it is hard to resist not coming to the verdict that  Madhyamikas were, in fact, nihilists.  In the last chapter of his book he writes:

 

“The Nihilistic interpretation of Madhyamika philosophy seems to be tacitly assumed to be impossible on the grounds that Nihilism itself is impossible, that Nihilism is a figment of imagination rather than a fact in the history of philosophy, and that it is impossible to think of philosopher worth the name maintaining Nihilism seriously.  Accordingly, the common tendency today is to interpret Madhyamika philosophy in such a way that it becomes a variety of idealism or even critical realism.  If the position were so simple, Vasubandhu would not have started as a Vaibhasika and ended as a Vijñânavadin; Dinnaga and Dharmakirti would not have had to accept Vijñânavada Paramarthically and Sautrantika philosophy empirically; and non-absolutists (including Buddhists) would not have directed their criticism against the Madhyamika on the score of Nihilism rather than on Absolutism” (p. 144).

 

On a final note, skepticism, nihilism and yes, fondness for the ‘empty’ are not so much philosophies as they are ways of avoiding the hard, introspective work of true philosophy which is to thoroughly know thyself (and thus free ourselves from the hellish).  In somewhat of a defense of Nagarjuna, his Dharmadhatustava (In Praise of Dharmadhatu), although brief, does not neglect the absolute or fail to give praise to the “luminious Mind.”  

 

Comments

[fofoo]

Not to forget, although Nietzsche called Buddhism a hundred times more realistic than christianity (and probably more sympathic), he called Christianity and
Buddhism nihilistic and decadent. See "the antichrist", chapter 20

[WuWeiTV (youtube)]

Was it not the case that Nagarjuna's purpose in demonstrating the limitations of all systems of thought was to encourage truth-seekers to seek the direct gnosis which you prescribe?

[Lama Guru Shining Path Holy Light]

Hey, the monkey found a banana at last.

At least you are finally attacking the absolute relativism which is stinking cesspool called skepticism.

I often look at SKEPTICISM magazine for ideas and laughs just as I look at Tricycle magazine for the filthy piece of crap it is.

[Lebensgeist]

"and that it is impossible to think of philosopher worth the name maintaining Nihilism seriously."

While anachronistic, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche can be called Nihilists. The latter one wanted to overcome Nihlism in "will to power" (reevaluation of all values)

The former one made his nihilistic approach clear:

"Dieses Nichts sollten wir nicht fürchten und nicht zu verscheuchen suchen und es nicht umgehen, wie die Inder, durch Mythen und bedeutungsleere Worte, wie Resorption in das Brahm oder Nirwana der Buddhisten. Wir bekennen es vielmehr frei: was nach gänzlicher Aufhebung des Willens übrig bleibt, ist für alle die, welche noch des Willens voll sind, allerdings Nichts. Aber auch umgekehrt ist denen, in welchen der Wille sich gewendet und verneint hat, diese unsere so sehr reale Welt mit allen ihren Sonnen und Milchstraßen - Nichts"

-Arthur Schopenhauer

"This void(nothing) we should not be afraid of, not to get rid of and we should not circumvent it like the Indians, who circumvent it with myths and empty words like resorption into Brahman or the nirvana of the Buddhists.

We rather confess it freely: What remains for those who are still full of will after total annihilation of the will is nothing. But on the other hand, for those in which the will has been denied , our so real world with all the suns and milkyways is- nothing."

As a side note, Frauwallner calls Nagarjuna`s analysis of causality fallacious in "Die Philosophie des Buddhismus".