The fall of the Theravadins

Permit me to rephrase something the German Theravadin monk Nyanatiloka once said: "Thus with this doctrine of egolessness, or anattâ, stands or falls Theravadin Buddhism.”  His original statement went as follows:  “Thus with this doctrine of egolessness, or anattâ, stands or falls the entire Buddhist structure” (Steven Collins, Selfless Persons, p. 5).  

Okay, why am I blogging this?  It’s because Theravada Buddhism is losing or has lost a good portion of its academic credibility insofar as it has been unable to sustain the argument that the Buddha categorically denied the self in the Pali Nikayas.  Buddhism has never stood on such a doctrine, but the Theravadins have.

While it is true that the argument can be sustained with ample evidence that the five khandhas or aggregates consisting of material shape, feeling, perception, volitional formations and consciousness, are not the self, or anattâ, or in everyday English, they are not my self, this is not a categorial denial of self.  It is just saying, I am not these aggregates.

The position the Buddha condemns is the belief that the five khandhas or aggregates are my self, this being the so-called personality view or sakkaya-ditthi.  In the Pali Nikayas, personality view then morphs into eternalism which is the belief in the eternality of the aggregates which I believe to be my self.  Again, this is condemned by the Buddha.  

This takes us to the most critical and weakest part of the Theravadin argument.  Theravadins have to explain, without mincing words, where the Buddha stands when he says of each aggregate: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self” thus abandoning all of them.  

The reasoning that underpins this demand is that if there is nothing beyond the sphere of the aggregates, then it is impossible to transcend or abandon them.  In that case, there can be no self, self in the sense of being transcendent.  However, the Buddha could not have said the following without transcending the five khandhas, completely.

“This Noble Eightfold Path is to be developed for direct knowledge of these five aggregates subject to clinging, for the full understanding of them, for their utter destruction, for their abandoning” (S. v. 61).

Considering this logically, I can only abandon what is not actually mine.  With regard to the aggregates, I can abandon each one of them because they are not mine.  I am really independent of them.  So, what does it mean to be independent of the aggregates by having abandoned them?  Are we speaking of a higher self than the personality (sakkaya)?  The Theravadins would argue, no.  But where does that leave them?  In sort of a limbo region?  How can the Buddha abandon the aggregates but not be beyond them, transcending them, completely?  If I abandon a burning house with five rooms, how can I not be somewhere else than in a burning house?

The Theravadins and those who help champion their cause cannot argue that the Buddha did not abandon the five khandhas or aggregates because the canon says otherwise.  But they can dodge the question of where is one who has abandoned the aggregates?  Indeed, they have to dodge the question because they know that the Buddha’s self is the self that is transcendent, that is, the higher self which he says is a refuge (attasaranâ); that stands above the impermanence and suffering of the aggregates. 

Comments

[Anthony]

I see what you guys are saying when it comes to the Buddhas 'self' as said in this khema sutta:
"Any feeling... Any perception... Any mental fabrication...

"Any consciousness by which one describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. Freed from the classification of consciousness, great king, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, hard to fathom, like the ocean. 'The Tathagata exists after death' doesn't apply. 'The Tathagata doesn't exist after death doesn't apply. 'The Tathagata both exists and doesn't exist after death' doesn't apply. 'The Tathagata neither exists nor doesn't exist after death' doesn't apply."

Apologies.

Gassho,

Anthony

[Anthony]

Thanks, I understand what you are saying in your views, I am still learning, I must learn to let go of even my own view. There must be a self, but an eternal self is hard to see because of impermanence. When I'm at work my mechanic self arises. When I'm at home with my wife and kids a husband/father self arises. When I am trying to understand dharma a student/listener self arises. So the self is a is something to be utilized. I have not died yet to find out what happens, but seeing the self which arises when I'm ticked off, knowing “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self”
Helps me to cling less. Or I could just be under the dumb forum Buddhist category, Haha. Nah I will continue to listen to everyone's comments, study dharma and find my Buddhism. Thanks.

[Jure K.]

Anthony: still, both extremes are not the same according to the Lankavatara Sutra. That is to say, even if both are wrong, it's better to be wrong in one way than the other (nihilism is worse than eternalism, they're not equivalent):

"Mahamati, this is why I say it is better to believe in a self as big as Mount Sumeru than to give rise to the vain and empty view of nothingness. Mahamati, the vanity of nothingness is what characterizes nihilists."

This suggests that while both views are incomplete, one (eternalism) is still somehow closer to the truth than the other.

[The Zennist]

Anthony:

Insisting on a determinate self is sakkaya (self=khandhas). Insisting there is no self is natthatta. Yes, both are extremes but this is not where the Buddha's self is coming from. The Buddha's self transcends all determination and spheres of being. This is why in commentarial literature Tathagata is equated with the self (tathâgato'ti attâ, UdA 340).

[Anthony]

If you say there is a self, you are clinging to one extreme where I may consider this self permanent, if you say there is no self nothing at all then you are clinging to another extreme. With dependent origination, I can see there is a self which arises, if I cling to it to believe its permanent then this is my ignorance which causes my suffering, my clingy mind. The Buddha did not deny a self, but he did not say a self was non existent. His path is a middle path so there arises a self which is non-self. When I think of a self automatically I think its permanent, but because of impermanence there could be no permanent self. This is only my opinion, a description after the fact, you must directly find out for yourself. I am not apart of The Therevadin section of buddhism.