In Buddhism there is what can only be described as a behind the scenes battle between those who don't believe the Buddha categorically denied the self and those who do. The latter essentially believe that the Buddha's great enlightenment testified to the fact that there is no self. This would be an odd or paradoxical teaching in itself were not it for the fact that the Buddha did not categorically deny the self in clear terms as many believe.
However, in clearest terms the Buddha almost always taught about things that are not to be identified with the self such as the Five Aggregates consisting of form or material shape, feeling, perception, habitual tendencies/volitions, and consciousness.
Taking this further, the Buddha taught that the Five Aggregates, which are believed to be one's own body (sakkaya), always exclude the self. The self, in other words, in not an aggregate thus it cannot be any part of the physical body which is always suffering. Still, one can falsely imagine that I am this or that aggregate. This is called a "view of own body" (sakkayaditthi) as the self which is a wrong view.
"But how, lady, does there come to be (wrong) view as to own body [sakkayaditthi]? In this case, friend Visakha, an uninstructed average person [puthjjana], taking no count of the pure ones ... taking no count of the true men ... regards material shape as the self, or the self as having material shape or material shape as in self or self as in material shape ; he regards feeling as self ... he regards perception as self ... he regards habitual tendencies as self ... he regards consciousenss as the self, or the self as having consciousness, or consciousness in the self, or the self in consciousness. Thus, friend Visakha, there comes to be (wrong) view as to own body [sakkayaditthi]" (M. i. 300) (trans. I.B. Horner). (Brackets are mine.)
Here we have a perfect example of the Buddha teaching about an ordinary person who has wrong view believing the Five Aggregates are the self. So what is the correct view? It is this:
But monks, an instructed disciple [ariya-savako] of the pure ones...taking count of the true men...well trained in the dhamma of the true men, regards material shape as: ‘This is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self;’ he regards feeling as: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self;’ he regards perception as: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self;’ he regards the habitual tendencies as: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self;’ he regards consciousness as: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ And also he regards whatever is see, heard, sensed, cognised, reached, looked for, pondered by the mind as: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self’ (M. i. 136) (trans. I.B. Horner). (Brackets are mine.)
As we can plainly see the Five Aggregates are not what I am, that is, they are not my self. Is this a categorial denial of self? It should also be obvious that the noble disciple’s self is totally different from the aggregates. The Buddha is teaching about things that are not to be identified with the disciple’s self. Is this then a categorical denial of self? Hardly.
We might conclude that the Buddha is teaching salvation by learning what is not my self so I will detach from it. Otherwise, I will continue to falsely regard as my self what is not my self. By such repeated detaching from what is not my self the true self gradually becomes outshining and recognizable in and through itself.
Neuroscience seems to imply that the sense of self is a function of the memory engrams of the brain, and disappears when the memory engrams deteriorate, as in Alzheimers. Therefore AI proposes to reproduce the memory engrams in a functional simulation of the brain, and thus the person or self will be reproduced. I have always assumed that the quality of sentience is an inherent potentiality of matter, not a unitary thing. Cld you comment on this from a Buddhist perspective?
Posted by: Alexander Duncan | August 15, 2010 at 01:08 PM